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NOTES
SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDITS AND THE 1983
AMENDMENTS TO THE EXPORT-IMPORT
BANK ACT
Export credit subsidies' play an important role in the export of
complex capital goods,2 because the high purchase prices of these
goods can make financing the decisive factor in a sale.3 Until the
1970s, U.S. producers were not seriously threatened by importation of
capital goods from countries whose governments subsidize exports. 4
Since the mid-1970s, however, that situation has changed, and the
United States has attempted to protect American producers' positions
in the domestic market through legislation and international
agreements. 5
1. An export credit subsidy, also referred to as an export bounty, is a government
subsidy paid on certain exports in order to develop an industry or to increase a country's
foreign trade. DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 159 (5th ed. 1970). They are usually granted
to finance the sale of capital goods such as machinery and equipment and are extended
either to suppliers to make them more competitive, or to buyers who need additional funds
for purchasing. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
[OECD], THE EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 7
(1982) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS].
2. Capital goods are economic goods, such as factories, buildings, and machinery, that
are used in the production of other goods. MCGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ECONOMICS 63 (3d ed. 1983). Complex capital goods are large-scale capital goods requir-
ing major investments, such as rail systems and factories. See EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING
SYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 7.
3. Favorable financing terms can reduce significantly the cost of expensive capital
goods. For example, in a study of the commuter aircraft industry, the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission found that favorable financing terms reduced the cost of for-
eign aircraft by 1.4% to 18.8%. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1328, ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF FOREIGN EXPORT CREDIT SUBSIDIES ON THE U.S. COMMUTER AIRCRAFT
INDUSTRY 32 (1982) [hereinafter cited as COMMUTER AIRCRAFT REPORT]; see JOINT ECo-
NOMIC COMM., 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE MERCANTILIST CHALLENGE TO THE LIB-
ERAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORDER 51 (Comm. Print 1982) (J. Zysman & S. Cohen,
authors).
4. See generally U.S. Trade Policy: Phase I: Administration and Other Public Agen-
cies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Trade Policy I Hearings] (statement
of William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Rep.) (summary of critical issues affecting U.S. trade).
5. Id. at 6; see Letter from William Brock, U.S. Trade Rep., to William Alberger,
Chairman, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n (May 25, 1982) (I.T.C. Docket No. 838) ("The
Administration and the Congress have become increasingly concerned over the potential
for trade distortion resulting from foreign government subsidization of financing for
exports of capital equipment, including exports to the United States, and the consequent
adverse effect on U.S. industries.").
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In the summer of 1982, a Canadian manufacturer that received
subsidized export financing defeated a U.S. manufacturer, the Budd
Company, in bidding for a contract to supply subway cars to the New
York Metropolitan Transit Authority. 6 The Budd Company previ-
ously had petitioned the United States Export-Import Bank
("Eximbank") for matching financing under section 1912 of the
Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978. 7 Section 1912 autho-
rizes the Eximbank to provide matching financing to domestic produ-
cers for sales in the U.S. market.8 The Eximbank denied matching
financing to the Budd Company, following a determination by Secre-
tary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan that the availability of export
credit subsidies was not a determining factor in the sale.9 In 1983,
Congress responded to the Budd incident by amending section 1912
of the Export-Import Bank Act.10 The 1983 amendment imposes a
time limit on the Eximbank's decision to provide matching financing
and requires matching financing when it is likely to be a significant
factor in the sale.I
This Note addresses the role of section 1912 in U.S. international
trade law and examines the reasons for the 1983 amendment. It traces
how the Budd Company's attempts to use section 1912 led to congres-
sional action. The Note also suggests future roles for the amended
section 1912 in U.S. trade law. Section I introduces export credit sub-
sidies and international negotiations to control them. Section II exam-
ines the original section 1912. Section III discusses the deficiencies in
section 1912 as revealed by the Budd incident. Section IV examines
the 1983 amendments enacted in response to the Budd incident.
I
AN INTRODUCTION TO EXPORT CREDIT
SUBSIDIES
A. THE NATURE OF EXPORT CREDIT SUBSIDIES
A purchaser receives an export credit subsidy whenever a govern-
ment provides financing at terms more favorable than those available
6. Wall St. J., May 19, 1982, at 6, col. 3.
7. 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3 (1982). See infra note 73 for the full text of section 1912.
8. Id
9. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE METROPOLI-
TAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK: DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY DONALD T. REGAN (July 13, 1982) (on file at the offices of the Cornell
International Law Journal). See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
10. Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 631, 97
Stat. 1262 (1983) (to be codified as amendments to 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3).
11. Id.
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to the purchaser through private commercial institutions.1 2 Export
credit subsidies transfer resources from taxpayers to exporters, or to
the importing country, without necessarily leading to long-term
improvement in the terms of trade.13 Nevertheless, all the major trad-
ing nations currently provide export credit subsidies14 and use official
export credit agencies to channel these subsidies to purchasers.1 5
In the 1950s, the major trading countries instituted official export
credit programs designed to encourage the export of major capital
goods to developing nations.' 6 The high cost of these goods and the
tenuous financial status of the buyers made credit sales necessary,
while the long maturities and numerous risks associated with such
sales virtually eliminated the private sector as a source of credit.' 7
Government export financing thus served initially as a means to bol-
ster exports by supplementing the purchasing power of developing
nations.' 8
The role of export credit financing has expanded greatly during
12. J. PEARCE, SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDIT 21 (1980). Export credit subsidies, the
basic ingredient of official export financing, are a non-tariff "distortion" of trade. Id. at 41.
A distortion is "a measure that reduces potential real world income, from 'that level attain-
able if resources and outputs are allocated in an economically efficient manner.'" Id.
13. In fact, the short-term effect of export credit subsidies is to worsen the terms of
trade. Trade Policy I Hearings, supra note 4, at 300 (statement of Marc E. Leland, Ass't
Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treas.).
14. United States export credit negotiators believe that six main reasons account for the
widespread use of export subsidies: (1) Many countries view subsidies as an expedient
method to improve trade or current account deficits; (2) Some nations' economic policies
are biased toward state intervention for favored sectors, including the export sector; (3)
Some foreign government officials believe that purchasing increased exports through credit
subsidization is a relatively cheap alternative to unemployment and welfare payments; (4)
Some policy makers believe that some "proper" or "natural" level for interest rates exists,
and that stable and fixed export credit rates reflect this underlying "proper" level; (5) Some
"countries hope to compensate their industries for their smaller scale of production" or
other comparative disadvantages; and (6) Some officials view export credits as foreign aid
to relieve the debt burden of the Lesser Developed Countries that receive the credits.
Export-Import Bank Budget Authorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 441, 443-44 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Eximbank Budget Authorization Hearings] (statement of John D. Lange, Acting Deputy
Ass't Sec'y, U.S. Treas. Dep't).
15. Duff, Outlook for Official Export Credits, 13 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L BUS. 891, 895
(1981). U.S. Trade Representative William Brock estimates that in 1980 France provided
$2.3 billion of export credit subsidies, the United Kingdom $1 billion, Japan $566 million,
and the United States $315 million. Trade Policy I Hearings, supra note 4, at 7 (statement
of William Brock, U.S.Trade Rep.). In 1980, government export credit in the United States
covered 12.8% of all manufactured exports. Meanwhile, the French government financed
25.2% of its exports, the British 50.8%, and the Japanese 42.4%. Special Report: Export
Subsidies, 42 CONG. Q. 376 (Feb. 19, 1983).
16. J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 2.
17. Id. at 2-3.
18. Id.
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the past thirty years. 19 Export credits first became an important factor
in trade competition in the 1960s. 20 When the major trading countries
began to offer official medium- and long-term credit for capital equip-
ment exports without regard for the importing country's purchasing
power, the reason for export credit programs shifted from encouraging
less developed countries' purchases to expanding the selling country's
export markets.21 As a result, the financing terms associated with
purchases of large capital goods became an element in the competition
for the sale of these items.22
Competition in export credit financing reached higher levels in
the 1970s. Major trading nations attempted to increase exports in
order to offset the inflated cost of imported oil caused by the 1973 oil
embargo,23 and competition to provide attractive export financing
packages increased dramatically. 24 Previously, government interven-
tion had been designed primarily to remove impediments to the attain-
ment of export financing from private banks. In the 1970s, however,
official export financing agencies assumed a more active role by subsi-
dizing interest rates directly and providing lengthy repayment terms. 25
Between 1978 and 1982, foreign export credit subsidies reached
unprecedented levels worldwide. 26 A sharp increase in market interest
rates, coupled with a worldwide recession, led many governments to
subsidize exports in order to stimulate their domestic economies and
to create employment. 27
19. While European nations have provided official support for exports since 1919, sup-
port offered before 1950 was limited largely to insurance of political and commercial risks.
Duff, supra note 15, at 895.
20. Duff, supra note 15, at 895-96.
21. J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 3-4.
22. Id. at v.
23. Duff, supra note 15, at 900. Some policy makers view export credit subsidies as a
method for improving the balance of payments. See supra note 14. See also U.S. EXPORT-
IMPORT BANK, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON EXPORT CREDIT COMPETITION AND
THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1980
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1980, at 83 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 EXIMBANK
REPORT To CONGRESS] (attributing large deficits in the United States balance of payments
to increased oil costs).
24. Duff, supra note 15, at 900.
25. J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 6.
26. According to information compiled by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, "[t]he
export credit subsidy problem reached critical proportions during 1981. . . .The subsidy
element-whether measured by the prevailing prime commercial interest rates or by the
cost of money to governments-peaked at all currencies during the third quarter of 1981."
Secretary of the Treasury, Report on International Export Credit Negotiations (1981-82),
reprinted in Export-Import Bank Programs and Policies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 204 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
Secretary].
27. See supra note 14. See Trade Policy I Hearings, supra note 4, at 300 (statement of
Marc E. Leland, Ass't Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treas.).
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B. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON EXPORT
CREDIT SUBSIDIES
The fierce competition in export credits that began in the 1970s
caused the major trading countries to recognize the need for interna-
tional negotiation and agreement.28 The Export Credit Group of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
sponsored negotiations29 and, after several interim agreements,
adopted the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported
Export Credit (the Arrangement) in 1978. 30 The Arrangement speci-
fies minimum interest rates and maximum maturity terms for subsi-
dized export credit financing.31 Permissible interest and maturity
terms vary according to the wealth of the importing country; the high-
est rates and the shortest maturities may be extended to buyers in "rel-
atively rich" countries, while progressively more lenient terms apply
to "intermediate and relatively poor" countries. 32 Minimum interest
rates under the Arrangement have always been lower than prevailing
28. Duff, supra note 15, at 900; J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 43. Economic leaders
from France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States
feared that the increased competition would trigger a "credit war." Duff, supra, at 900.
These countries therefore initiated negotiations aimed at limiting this credit race. Id.
These negotiations paved the way for a 1974 OECD declaration which emphasized the
need for international cooperation, rather than competition. See infra notes 30-64 and
accompanying text.
The International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, the Berne Union, was an
early private attempt to provide a forum for the exchange of information on export credit
financing. Founded in 1934, the Union's members still meet regularly to discuss export
credit insurance matters. Duff, supra note 15, at 898 n.30; 1981 EXIMBANK REPORT To
CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 22.
29. J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 43; The member countries of the OECD are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 2. The Export Credit
Group of the OECD was founded in 1963. Duff, supra note 15, at 897.
30. Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (Trade Direc-
torate of OECD, Feb. 22, 1978), reprinted in U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 196, at 0-
1 (Feb. 28, 1978) [hereinafter cited as the Arrangement]. For a discussion of interim agree-
ments leading to the Arrangement, see Duff, supra note 15, at 900. All the OECD mem-
bers, except Ieland and Turkey, are participants in the Arrangement. EXPORT CREDIT
FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 7-8.
31. The Arrangement excludes certain categories of exports from its coverage: aircraft,
nuclear power plants, military equipment, agricultural commodities, and some classes of
ships. The Arrangement, supra note 30, at 10.
32. In a release discussing interest rate changes in the Arrangement, the Department of
the Treasury provided the following summary of interest rates:
1984]
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commercial rates.33
From 1978 until October 15, 1982, the Arrangement did little to
curb export credit competition. The interest and maturity terms it
established were not mandatory, but functioned as voluntary guide-
lines.34 An OECD member could derogate from the established guide-
lines without violating the Arrangement if it notified other
participants of its intention to do so at least ten calendar days before
Interest Rates as of July 1, 1982
Classification of 2-5 5-8.5 8.5-10
Borrowing Country Years Years Years
I. Relatively Rich 12.15% 12.4% no credit
GNP per capita (11%) (11.25%)
income over $4000 [8.55]2 [8./75%]
II. Intermediate 10.85% 11.35% no credit
Countries (10.5%) (11%)
[8%] [8.5%]
Countries newly graduated from III to II
Effective 10.5% 10.75% 10.75%
Immediately (10%) (10%) (10%)
[7.5%] [7.75%] [7.75%]
1/1/83 10.85% 11.35% 11.35%
III. Poorest 10% 10% 10%
Countries (10%) (10%) (10%)
[7.5%] [7.75%] [7.75%]
1 (Post Nov. '81 Interest Rates)
2 [Pre Nov. '81 Interest Rates]
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., TREASURY NEWS 2 (July 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as TREAS-
URY NEWS].
33. The following chart sets forth the Arrangement interest rate on 5 to 8.5 year credits
to relatively rich countries, and the prime rate, on specified dates:
(figures are percentage rates)
Date Arrangement Prime Difference
Rate Rate
Jan. 1, 19771 8.00 6.25 -1.75
Apr. 1, 1978 8.00 8.00
June 1, 1980 8.00 11.50 3.50
July 1, 1980 8.75 11.00 2.25
Oct. 1, 1981 8.75 18.00 9.25
Nov. 17, 1982 11.25 16.00 4.75
June 1, 1982 11.25 16.50 5.25
July 6, 1982 12.40 15.50 3.10
Sept. 30, 1982 12.40 13.00 .60
1 The OECD arrangement became effective on April 1, 1978. The
arrangement rate shown for January 1, 1977, is from the OECD Consensus on
Export Credits.
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1340, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN EXPORT
CREDIT SUBSIDIES ON CERTAIN U.S. INDUSTRIES 169 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FOR-
EIGN SUBSIDIES IMPACT REPORT].
34. "The guidelines set out in this Arrangement represent the most generous terms for
which participants intend in general to give official support." The Arrangement, supra note
30, at 8(a).
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issuing a loan commitment. 35 After ten days, other Arrangement par-
ticipants could issue export credits on the same terms unless the initi-
ating participant withdrew the nonconforming terms. 36 On October
15, 1982, however, a "non-derogation" commitment among OECD
members became effective. 37
The United States took an active role in early OECD negotia-
tions38 and was an original signatory of the Arrangement.39 After
adoption of the Arrangement, the United States altered its position. It
began to view the Arrangement as merely an important first step in
eliminating export credit financing competition, not a solution to the
problem of potentially destructive export subsidy competition among
nations.4° United States negotiators hoped to take advantage of the
Arrangement's review framework 41 to effect changes in some of the
guidelines, particularly those concerning interest rates and maturity
terms.4 2
A review of official U.S. policy toward export credit subsidies is
instructive. The U.S. government originally took the position that
export credit subsidies are a legitimate element of international trade
competition and should not be subject to unnecessary regulation. 43
The United States now takes the position that subsidized export cred-
its distort trade and investment.44 The government asserts that
35. The Arrangement, supra note 30, at t 9(a)(1). If another participant requested a
discussion during this period, the initiating participant was required to delay an additional
ten days. Id. Duff notes a problem with the original "notification of intention to derogate"
principle. "[I]n practice. . . notification is often not given until a firm commitment has
been made in connection with the signing of a contract or letter of intent." Duff, supra note
15, at 949-50.
36. The Arrangement, supra note 30, at t 9(a)(2). If a participant requested a discus-
sion during the first ten-day period, the second ten-day period became the relevant one.
37. Subsidized Export Financing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Subsidized Export Financing
Hearing] (statement of Marc E. Leland, Ass't Sec'y Treas. for Int'l Affairs). The ultimate
effect of this "non-derogation" agreement is beyond the scope of this Note.
38. See Duff, supra note 15, at 900.
39. The Arrangement, supra note 30, at annex C.
40. At a meeting of the OECD Ministerial Council in mid-June 1978, when the
Arrangement had been in force for just two-and-one-half months, U.S. Treasury Secretary
Michael Blumenthal drew attention to the need for a broadened and strengthened Arrange-
ment. J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 52. See Export Financing: New Export Credit Agree-
ment "Disappointing" to U.S., U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 196, at A-1 (Feb. 28,
1978).
41. "Participants will review, at least annually, the operation in practice of these guide-
lines." The Arrangement, supra note 30, at 13.
42. Duff, supra note 15, at 907 & n.76.
43. See NAT'L ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT'L MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES,
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 1, 1972 - JUNE 30,
1973, at 35 (1973).
44. TREASURY NEWS, supra note 32, at 1 (statement of Donald T. Regan, Sec'y of the
Treas.); Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
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exports should compete on the basis of their price and quality, not on
the basis of a government's ability to subsidize export financing.45 The
United States has also taken the position that only strengthened inter-
national agreements can provide a long-term solution to the subsidized
export financing problem. 46
Congress viewed the early international negotiations on export
credits as ineffective.4 7 Members of Congress expressed concern that
despite international agreements, other countries' export credit poli-
cies were eroding markets for American capital goods.48 Congress
sought to strengthen the United States' position in export credit nego-
tiations by improving the ability of Eximbank, the official American
export credit agency, to compete with its foreign counterparts. 49
Since the adoption of the Arrangement, the United States has
expressed dissatisfaction with a number of Arrangement provisions.50
In negotiations since the passage of section 1912, the United States has
advocated increasing the minimum interest rate level to align it more
closely with market conditions and changing the method used in the
Arrangement to set minimum interest rates.51 The ultimate American
objective is to eliminate export credit subsidies as a factor in interna-
tional trade.52
In 1978, the United States proposed an increase in the Arrange-
ment's minimum interest rates.53 At first, the European Economic
International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 55-56 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Export-Import
Bank Amendments Hearings] (statement of Marc E. Leland, Ass't Sec'y of the Treas. for
Int'l Affairs).
45. See Report of the Secretary, supra note 26, at 202.
46. PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, THE EXPORT IMPERATIVE: REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT IMPERATIVE REPORT]. The problem is
essentially one of conflicting interests. United States policy has at different times recog-
nized both the danger of widespread export credit activity to international trade relations
and the detrimental effect this policy has on domestic producers. Without export credits,
American manufacturers like the Budd Company cannot compete with their foreign coun-
terparts who receive subsidies.
47. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
48. Id.
49. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 1115, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
50. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. See J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 52-
53; U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON EXPORT CREDIT
COMPETITION AND THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
PERIOD APRIL 1, 1978 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1978, at 41 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
1979 EXIMBANK REPORT TO CONGRESS].
51. Duff, supra note 15, at 907 n.76. See generally id. at 907-14 for a discussion of the
interest rate matrix negotiations.
52. 1983 Export-Import Bank Amendments Hearings, supra note 44, at 56 (statement of
Marc E. Leland, Ass't See'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treas.).
53. The United States sought increases in the minimum interest rate level of 0.50 to
0.75%. Duff, supra note 15, at 907.
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Community (EEC) firmly resisted all proposed changes,54 but in 1980
it agreed to small increases in the Arrangement's minimum interest
rates.5 5 In September 1981, the EEC proposed increases of 2.0 to
2.5% in the basic matrix rate.5 6 The United States regarded these pro-
posed increases as an "exceptionally modest first step," and proposed a
4.0% increase in the matrix rates as an alternative.5 7 Arrangement
participants adopted a compromise position.58
Negotiations in 1982 resulted in significant changes-improve-
ments, from the United States' point of view-in the Arrangementi 9
The classification of borrowing nations was reformed according to
objective criteria. ° Minimum interest rates were increased. 61 Effec-
tive October 15, 1982, participants pledged not to derogate from the
54. J. PEARCE, supra note 12, at 53. The countries of the EEC negotiate as a single
entity in the Arrangement. Id. at 45-47.
55. On July 1, 1980, increases of 0.75% for relatively rich and intermediate countries
and 0.25% for relatively poor countries went into effect. Duff, supra note 15, at 910. In
December, 1980, the EEC agreed to increases of 1.7% for relatively rich and intermediate
countries and 0.8% for relatively poor countries. Id. at 911. The United States character-
ized the interest rate increases offered by the Europeans as "trivial" and "grossly inade-
quate." Trade Policy I Hearings, supra note 4, at 306 (statement of Marc E. Leland, Ass't
Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treas.); see also 1981 Eximbank Budget Authorization
Hearings, supra note 14, at 423 (statement of Margaret W. Kahliff, Dir., Export-Import
Bank).
56. Trade Policy I Hearings, supra note 4, at 306 (statement of Marc E. Leland).
57. Id. at 307 (statement of Marc E. Leland, Ass't Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the
Treas.). The proposed increase in the matrix rate of 4% would have brought the overall
matrix up to approximately 12%. Report of the Secretary, supra note 26, at 208.
58. The Compromise Matrix was adopted on October 20, 1981 and was to take effect
on November 16, 1981. This matrix is detailed below, with the previous minimum interest
rates listed in parentheses for comparison.
Loan Term
2-5 Years 5-8.5 Years Over 8.5 Years
Rich Countries 11.0 (8.5) 11.25 (8.75) 1
Intermediate Countries 10.5 (8.0) 11.0 (8.50) 1
Poor Countries 10.0 (7.1) 10.0 (7.75) 10.0 (7.75)
1 Not applicable.
Trade Policy I Hearings, supra note 4, at 307 (statement of Marc E. Leland).
Another positive result of negotiations to reduce export credits in 1981 occurred when
the United States, France, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany adopted a "com-
mon line" on the financing of large commercial aircraft. Id. Despite these positive devel-
opments, the Treasury Department characterized progress in negotiating improvements to
the Arrangement in 1981 as "frustratingly slow." Report of the Secretary, supra note 26, at
206.
59. See TREASURY NEws, supra note 32, at 1-2.
60. A borrowing country's classification, whether "relatively rich," "intermediate," or
"relatively poor" determines the permissible minimum interest rate for export credits to
that country. Since July 1, 1982, the "relatively rich" category consists of countries with a
1979 per capita GNP of $4,000 or more. To be classified as "relatively poor," a country
must be eligible for International Development Association financing. All remaining coun-
tries are classified as "intermediate." Export-Import Bank Programs and Policies: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1982) [hereinafter cited
308 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:299




LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE EXPORT-IMPORT
BANK ACT
In 1945, Congress created the Eximbank to "supplement the
commercial financing of U.S. export sales."' 63 The Eximbank has
developed several programs to further this objective.64 First, it offers
long-term loans to foreign purchasers. 65 Second, it guarantees
medium- and long-term loans to foreign purchasers by U.S. commer-
cial banks.66 Finally, in conjunction with the Foreign Credit Insur-
ance Association, 67 the Eximbank provides export credit insurance
coverage to U.S. exporters. 68 The Eximbank was created with an ini-
as Eximbank Programs and Policies Hearings] (statement of William H. Draper III, Pres.
and Chinn., U.S. Export-Import Bank).
61. See supra note 32 for recently negotiated rates. The minimum Arrangement rates
became high enough that if commercial interest rates continued to fall, the subsidy element
in Eximbank lending would disappear completely. Report of the Secretary, supra note 26,
at 220. At market interest rates prevalent in September, 1982, the new Arrangement signif-
icantly decreased the subsidy element in French and United Kingdom export credits and
virtually eliminated the subsidy element for Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Id. at 220.
62. Report of the Secretary, supra note 26, at 212. See supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text.
63. U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, FISCAL 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 13 [hereinafter cited
as 1981 EXIMBANK ANNUAL REPORT]; see Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, ch. 341,
§ 2(b), 59 Stat. 527. The Eximbank supplements the financing of United States exports by
extending loans and guarantees, and insuring repayment of loans provided by other institu-
tions. Id. In 1978, Congress amended the Eximbank's charter, hoping the Bank would
aggressively offer financing terms competitive with those offered by the export credit agen-
cies of other Western governments. Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-630, tit. XIX, 92 Stat. 3724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 635, 635a-1, 635a-2, 635a-3
(1982)).
The Eximbank recently surveyed a group of banks and exporters on the relative competi-
tiveness of the export credit systems of the major trading nations. The exporters and bank-
ers ranked Eximbank programs as the least competitive of the six national export credit
systems included in the survey. 1981 EXIMBANK REPORT To CONGRESS, supra note 23, at
17.
64. The Eximbank operates its programs in conjunction with the Foreign Credit Insur-
ance Association, "a group of 50 leading private insurance companies and the Private
Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO), which is owned by 54 commercial banks, 7 indus-
trial firms and 1 investment banking firm." EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra
note 1, at 241. 1979 EXIMBANK REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 50, at 124.
65. 1981 EXIMBANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 13. Export sales with a con-
tract value in excess of $5 million and/or which involve long construction or fabrication
periods are eligible for the direct credit program. EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS,
supra note 1, at 247.
66. 1981 EXIMBANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 13-14.
67. See supra note 64.
68. 1981 EXIMBANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 14. The Foreign Credit
Insurance Association works with Eximbank to provide insurance policies covering "repay-
ment risks on short- and medium-term sales." Id. See supra note 64.
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tial capitalization of one billion dollars.6 9 Although government-
owned, the Eximbank is a self-sustaining corporation.70 Unlike most
of its foreign counterparts, it does not receive public funds; rather, it
obtains funds in the open capital market.71
In 1978, Congress passed a series of amendments to the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945.72 Section 1912 was added to the Act. It
authorized the Eximbank to provide matching financing to American
producers whose domestic sales were jeopardized by foreign producers
benefitting from foreign export credits at "noncompetitive" rates.73
Section 1912 required that the Secretary of the Treasury initially
69. The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, ch. 341, § 4, 59 Stat. 528 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 635b (1982)).
70. 1981 EXIMBANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 3.
71. The Eximbank receives no direct appropriations. Its loan activities, including
interest and fees, generate revenues. EXPORT IMPERATIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 96.
The Eximbank also funds its operations by borrowing, principally from the Federal Financ-
ing Bank and the United States Treasury. 1981 EXIMBANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
63, at 13. The Eximbank possesses authority to borrow up to $6 billion directly from the
U.S. Treasury. It uses this authority to meet short-term cash needs. Id. at 22.
Between 1934 and 1966, the Eximbank received more interest on its loans than it paid on
its borrowing. The Bank's profits during this period totalled over $3 billion. Of this
amount, the Eximbank paid $1 billion to the U.S. Treasury in the form of dividends, and
retained $2 billion in reserves invested as export loans. Since 1966, however, the interest
rate on its outstanding debt has been greater than the proceeds on its loan portfolio.
Because the Bank had invested its interest-free reserves and $1 billion capital in export
loans, however, the Bank was able to earn a profit through fiscal year 1982. 1981
Eximbank Budget Authorization Hearings, supra note 14, at 419-21 (statement of Margaret
W. Kahliff, Dir., U.S. Export-Import Bank).
In recent years, the interest rate at which the Eximbank borrows has substantially
exceeded its lending rate. Coupled with increased demand for the Bank's services, this led
to the first net operating deficit in the Bank's history in fiscal year 1982. Id.
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 limits Eximbank's authority to lend, guarantee,
and insure to $40 billion outstanding at any one time. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1982). For fiscal
year 1983, Congress limited the Eximbank's direct lending authority to $4.4 billion, and its
ability to offer guarantees on commercial loans to $9 billion. 41 CONG. Q. 378 (Feb. 19,
1983). In its fiscal 1984 budget request, thq Reagan Administration asked for $3.8 billion
in direct lending authority, but it said it wold offer a supplemental request for $2.7 billion
if additional funds proved necessary. The 1984 requested budget proposed to increase the
loan guarantee ceiling to $10 billion. Iad at 379.
72. Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XIX, 92
Stat. 3724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 635, 635a-1, 635a-2, 635a-3 (1982)).
73. Pub. L. 95-630, § 1912, 92 Stat. 3726 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3 (1982)). Sec-
tion 1912 originally provided:
(a)(1) Upon receipt of information that foreign sales to the United States are being
offered involving foreign official export credits which exceed limits under existing
standstills, minutes, or practices to which the United States and other major
exporting countries have agreed, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately
conduct an inquiry to determine whether "non-competitive financing" is being
offered.
(2) If the Secretary determines that such foreign "non-competitive" financing is
being offered, he shall request the immediate withdrawal of such financing by the
foreign official export credit agency involved.
(3) If the offer is not withdrawn or if there is no immediate response to the with-
drawal request, the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the country offering such
financing and all parties to the proposed transaction that the Eximbank may be
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determine that foreign goods were being offered to U.S. buyers at non-
competitive prices. 74 This determination required the Secretary to
request the foreign export credit authority to withdraw its noncompet-
itive financing. If the foreign export credit authority refused to with-
draw its noncompetitive financing, or if it did not respond to the
withdrawal request before the date the Eximbank was authorized to
provide financing,75 and if the Secretary determined that the financing
was "likely to be a determining factor in the sale,"' 76 the Secretary
could authorize the Eximbank to provide matching financing to the
competing U.S. producer.77
Section 1912 on its face seems to be directed primarily at improv-
ing the competitive position of U.S. producers.78 But the legislative
history of section 1912 reveals that Congress enacted it in order to
improve the United States' position in negotiating and enforcing inter-
national agreements on export financing.79 Senator Adlai Stevenson,
who, with Senator John Heinz, offered the 1978 amendment on the
Senate floor, expressed concern that foreign countries were violating
their obligations under the Arrangement. 80 In introducing section
1912, Senator Stevenson emphasized that although the Eximbank
authorized to provide competing United States sellers with financing to match that
available through the foreign official export financing entity.
(b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall only issue such authorization to the Bank
to provide guarantees, insurance and credits to competing United States sellers, if
he determines that:
(1) the availability of foreign official non-competitive financing is likely to be a
determing factor in the sale, and
(2) the foreign non-competitive financing has not been withdrawn on the date the
Bank is authorized to provide competitive financing.
(c) Upon receipt of authorization by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Export-
Import Bank may provide financing to match that offered by the foreign official
export credit entity: Provided, however, That loans, guarantees and insurance pro-
vided under this authority shall conform to all provisions of the Export-Import
Bank Act of 1945, as amended.
Id.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(a)(1).
75. 12 U.S.C. §§ 635a-3(a)(3), 635a-3(b)(2).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(b)(1) (emphasis added).
77. 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(a)(3).
78. Section 1912(a)(3) provides that the Eximbank "may be authorized to provide
competing United States sellers with financing to match that available through the foreign
official export financing entity." 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(a)(3) (emphasis added).
79. Our hope. . . is that with such authority to meet the competition, we will be in
a stronger position to negotiate agreements and in a stronger position to enforce
agreements aimed at controlling predatory financing of exports. The purpose of
this amendment is not to declare or to accelerate a credit war. Its purpose is to put
the United States in a position to end a credit war in the financing of exports.
124 CONG. Rc. S32,836 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Adlai Stevenson).
80. "[B]ecause several governments continue to use low-cost export credits as a key
instrument for overseas sales, it has been impossible to curb such practices." Proposal To
Authorize the Eximbank To Counter Predatory Financing Practices of Foreign Govern-
ments: I. Rationale for the Proposal, 124 CONG. REC. S32,836 (1978).
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existed "to provide guarantees, insurance, and extensions of credit at
rates and on terms and other conditions which are competitive with
the Government-supported rates and terms and other conditions avail-
able"81 from principal export nations, it lacked authority to combat
the predatory financing of exports to the United States.82 Section 1912
was designed to provide this authority and to "deter other countries
from engaging in predatory financing practices. 8s3
In the first four years after its passage in 1978, section 1912 had
no impact on the competitive positions of individual American pro-
ducers. There were no attempts to use the section until the Budd inci-
dent.84 One explanation for this failure to use section 1912 may be
that the importation of noncompetitively financed goods was less
widespread than the authors of the provision had anticipated. Non-
competitive foreign financing of goods introduced into the United
States had been far less a problem than similar financing of goods
exported to third countries.8 5 When subsidized export financing to
U.S. markets had been available, it was not a critical element in buy-
ers' decisions to purchase products.8 6
There is, however, evidence that the financing advantage is
becoming more important in the export of foreign goods to the United
States.8 7 The tremendous increases in interest rates in recent years
and the difficulties that some domestic purchasers face in obtaining
credit have increased the importance of seller financing.88 Thus, for-
eign sellers who benefit from subsidized financing have an increasingly
important advantage over domestic manufacturers. In recent years,
81. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(A) (1982).
82. 124 CONG. REc. S32,836 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Adlai Stevenson).
83. Id.
84. See infra Section III (A). Congressman James Blanchard, sponsor of H.R. 6760,
Press Release (July 12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Blanchard press release] (copy on file at
the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
85. In a survey conducted by the National Association of Manufacturers covering
1972-76, 57% of domestic manufacturers who responded to the survey reported lost export
sales due to inadequate financing. The lost sales totalled $3.2 billion for the survey group.
NAT'L ASW'N OF MFR., NAM EXPORT CREDIT SURVEY SPECIAL REPORT (Dec. 28, 1977).
86. In a study of the commuter aircraft industry, the International Trade Commission
concluded that financing was not a critical factor in the decision of U.S. airline operators to
purchase commuter aircraft. In fact, U.S. airlines reported that in no instance did subsi-
dized financing offered by foreign producers cause them to select a foreign commuter air-
craft over a domestically built one. COMMUTER AIRCRAFT REPORT, supra note 3, at 38.
87. Report of the Secretary, supra note 26, at 142 (statement of Amb. William E.
Brock, U.S. Trade Rep.) ("The proclivity of foreign governments to provide subsidized
export financing to U.S. purchasers has, in a number of instances, placed the U.S. firm at a
serious disadvantage. . . the MTA case is not an isolated instance of this problem, but
may be indicative of a growing trend.").
88. A U.S. International Trade Commission study of financing in the sale of commuter
aircraft from 1977 to 1981 indicates that since 1977 leasing and seller financing of com-
muter aircraft purchases have increased in importance, while bank loans have decreased in
importance. COMMUTER AIRCRAFT REPORT, supra note 3, at xi.
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there have been many cases involving foreign subsidy of interest rates
at noncompetitive levels.89
III
THE BUDD INCIDENT: DEFICIENCIES IN
SECTION 1912 OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT
BANK ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1978
A. THE BUDD INCIDENT
The U.S. Treasury Department received its first request from a
domestic producer to institute a section 1912 investigation into non-
competitive foreign export credit subsidies in May, 1982, two-and-one-
half years after the addition of section 1912.90 In November 1981, the
New York Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) solicited bids for
the manufacture of 1150 subway cars.91 In January 1982, four subway
car manufacturers submitted offers: the Budd Company (Budd),
Nissho-Iwai American Corporation, representing Kawasaki Heavy
Industries of Japan (Kawasaki), Francorail, a consortium of French
companies, and Bombardier, Inc., a Canadian manufacturer and a
licensee of Kawasaki.92 In March 1982, the MTA separated 325 sub-
way cars from its original proposal and awarded a $274 million con-
tract to produce these cars to Kawasaki. 93 The MTA continued to
negotiate with Budd, Francorail, and Bombardier for the remaining
825 cars. 94
89. Including the Budd Case, in the first 10'A months of 1982 there were eight known
incidents of foreign exports to the United States that benefitted from subsidized export
financing at levels that violated the Arrangement. FOREIGN SUBSIDIES IMPACT REPORT,
supra note 33, at 169. During this period, the Eximbank received notice of 17 potential
derogations from the Arrangement involving export credits to the United States. In nine
cases "either the product involved was not covered by the arrangement, or a credit that
would violate the arrangement was discussed but apparently not granted." Id. at 169 n.l.
90. See Subsidized Export Financing Hearing, supra note 37, at 13 (statement of Marc
E. Leland, Ass't Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treas.).
91. Affidavit of Steven M. Polan, Special Counsel to the New York Metropolitan
Transit Authority 3 (May 28, 1982), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., FINANCING
OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF NEW
YORK: DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY DONALD T. REGAN (July 13,
1982) (on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
92. Id
93. Id. at 5. The Japanese government provided a loan "denominated in yen in an
amount equivalent to $126 million" as financing for this sale. The loan featured an interest
rate of nine percent and a five-year repayment term. Kawasaki re-lent this money to the
MTA in U.S. dollars, adding a surcharge to cover the foreign exchange risk. "With this
surcharge, the effective dollar interest rate paid by the MTA was 12.25 percent." This rate
was within the Japanese commercial interest rates and well above the minimum rate that
the Arrangement required Japan to charge. New York MTA Purchase of Canadian Subway
Cars: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Senate Finance MTA Hearing] (statement of R.T. MeNamar, Dep'y Sec'y,
Dep't of the Treas.).
94. Id. at 58 (statement of Richard Ravitch, chmn., N.Y.C. MTA).
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On May 18, 1982, the MTA announced its intention to award a
contract for the production of the remaining 825 subway cars to Bom-
bardier.95 On June 10, the MTA and Bombardier signed a $663 mil-
lion contract, which was contingent upon the availability of financing
from the official Canadian export credit agency, the Export Develop-
ment Corporation (EDC).96 The EDC financing enabled Bombardier
to offer a financial package that would save the MTA $90 million in
interest charges during the term of the purchase.97
On May 17, 1982, the Budd Company requested that the Depart-
ment of the Treasury commence a section 1912 investigation of the
allegedly noncompetitive financing.98 Three days later, the Treasury
Department asked the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa to investigate the
Canadian financing offer and to urge the Canadian government to
comply with the OECD Arrangement,99 but these diplomatic efforts
failed. ioo
Shortly before the signing of the MTA-Bombardier contract,
Budd filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, seeking to enjoin execution of the contract until
the Treasury Department decided whether matching financing from
Eximbank would be offered under section 1912.101 Budd, the MTA,
95. Id. at 8 (statement of R.T. McNamar, Dep'y Sec'y, Dep't of the Treas.). "The
Bombardier proposal included a final negotiated price of $803,000 per car, with final deliv-
ery May, 1987. Budd's final proposal for these 825 cars was $770,000 per car, with final
delivery October, 1986." Id. at 24 (statement of Gary N. Horlick, Dep'y Ass't Sec'y of
Commerce for Import Admin.).
96. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., FINANCING OF SUBWAY CARS FOR THE METROPOLI-
TAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK: DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY DONALD T. REGAN 3 (July 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as DECISION OF
THE SECRETARY] (on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
The Export Development Corporation (EDC), a Crown holding company established in
1969, is an autonomous, unsubsidized government corporation with total export support
authority of $22.2 billion (U.S.). Until recently the EDC's role in Canadian trade has been
somewhat limited. However, due to changing economic conditions, Canada has placed
increased emphasis on the use of export credit subsidies. See 1981 EXIMBANK REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 30-31.
97. Senate Finance MTA Hearing, supra note 93, at 61 (statement of Richard Ravitch,
Chmn., N.Y.C. MTA).
98. Id. at 8 (statement of R.T. McNamar, Dep'y Sec'y, Treas. Dep't). The Canadian
financing violated the Arrangement guidelines for sales to "rich countries" such as the
United States. The Arrangement guidelines in force at the time of the sale specifie4-: (a)
cover: maximum 85% of export value (in this case about $336 million); (b) term: 8.5 years
maximum; (c) interest rate: 11.25% minimum. DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, supra note
96 (MTA Decision Fact Sheet, at 1-2). The Canadian financing offer provided for a cover
of 85% of the total contract price (about $560 million), a term of 10 years, and an interest
rate of 9.7%. Id.
99. Senate Finance MTA Hearing, supra note 93, at 9 (statement of R.T. McNamar,
Dep'y Sec'y, Dep't of the Treas.).
100. DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, supra note 96, at 1.
101. Consultations with the Canadians resulted in a "standoff." Subsidized Export
Financing Hearing, supra note 37, at 179.
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and Bombardier stipulated to insert into the contract a clause that
granted the MTA the option to cancel the contract if the Treasury
Department authorized matching financing under section 1912 by July
15, 1982.102
On July 13, 1982, Secretary of Treasury Donald T. Regan
announced that he would not authorize the Eximbank to match the
subsidized Canadian financing for the MTA's purchase.10 3 The Secre-
tary found the EDC financing to be "noncompetitive" within the
meaning of section 1912,104 but he determined that the requirements
of the section had not been met. 10 5
The Department of the Treasury considered seven factors that
might have affected the MTA's decision to award the contract to one
manufacturer or another: the availability of adequate government-
supported financing from the vendors; the cost of financing; the price
of the cars; delivery schedules, including reliability of delivery; quality
of design, engineering, and performance, including compatibility with
Japanese-built cars that the MTA had already ordered; possible
overdependence on a single supplier; and New York State manufactur-
ing content.10 6 Secretary Regan announced: "I have concluded that
Bombardier would be awarded the contract even if Budd were able to
offer matching financing. Thus, I am compelled to conclude that the
noncompetitive financing offered by EDC is not likely to be 'a deter-
mining factor' in the MTA's decision." 10 7
B. DEFICIENCIES OF SECTION 1912
Analysis of the Treasury Department's investigation of the Budd
incident reveals the deficiencies of section 1912. As it was written in
1982, the section required the Secretary to conclude that the availabil-
ity of foreign noncompetitive financing was "likely to be a determining
factor" in a sale before he could authorize the Eximbank to offer
matching financing.10 8 This "determining factor" standard does not
appear in any other provision of the United States Code. 109 The
102. Budd's suit sought to enjoin MTA from submitting the contract to the New York
State Public Authorities Control Board for approval. DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, supra
note 96, at 3.
103. DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, supra note 96, at 4.
104. Id. at 2.
105. "I have determined that the EDC financing offered in support of Bombardier's
proposal exceeds allowable international limits on export credits, and that the EDC has
refused to withdraw its non-competitive financing despite repeated requests by officials of
the Treasury Department." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id at 2.
109. 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(b)(1) (1982). See supra notes 73-77, 105-08 and accompanying
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sparse legislative history of section 1912 sheds no light on the interpre-
tation of the phrase. 1 0 Moreover, no judicial decisions construe this
language. 11
The Treasury Department purported to construe the "determin-
ing factor" provision "according to [its] plain meaning, and not as [a]
legal [term] of art."'" 2 According to the Department's construction, a
factor was "determining" only if it directly affected the outcome of a
transaction. 1 3 In the Department's view, a number of factors could
cause a purchaser to choose one seller over another, and any one of
these elements could be "a determining factor."" 4 The Department
asked whether the purchaser would have awarded the contract to the
American bidder if its financing terms had been equal to those of the
foreign bidder." 5 Thus, the Treasury Department believed that sec-
tion 1912 required it to reconstruct private business decisions." 6
Because these decisions are often complex and sometimes confused, an
attempt to reconstruct them is at best difficult and at worst
artificial. 117
110. Memorandum from Peter J. Wallison, General Counsel of the Department of the
Treasury, to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan 1 (June 23, 1982) (Deciding what 'is likely
to be a determining factor' under Section 1912 of the Export-Import Bank Act Amend-
ments of 1978), reprinted in DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, supra note 96 [hereinafter cited
as Wallison Memorandum].
111. Id.
112. Id. The comments of Senator Adlai Stevenson reveal only that section 1912 was
not intended to "permit across-the-board financing of U.S. domestic sales. Specified pre-
requisites would be established for the use of the authority." Proposal To Authorize the
Eximbank To Counter Predatory Financing Practices of Foreign Governments: I. Ration-
ale for the Proposal, 124 CONG. REc. S32,836 (1978). See infra note 113.
113. In defining "determining," the Treasury Department referred to the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary, which defines the term: "that which decides or leads to a decision; that
which fixes a course ofaction." Wallison Memorandum, supra note 110, at 1.
We are therefore remitted to construing the Section's words as according to their
plain meaning, and not as legal terms of art. In this connection, the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary defines "determining" to mean that which decides, or leads to a
decision, that which fixes a course of action.
Wallison Memorandum, supra, at 1.
114. See Wallison Memorandum, supra note 110, at 2.
115. Id.
116. The Wallison Memorandum asserts that the Treasury Department is required to
undertake "a close analysis of the purchasing agency's corporate state of mind, and ulti-
mately a judgment as to what it would have done had the financing terms been different
from what they were in fact." Wallison Memorandum, supra note 110, at 3. See Subsi-
dized Export Financing Hearing, supra note 37, at 14 (statement of Marc E. Leland, Ass't
Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treas.).
117. "The language of Section 1912 clearly requires the Treasury staff to conduct an
inquiry which focuses entirely on the facts of the case as seen by the MTA Board." Letter
from Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, to James MeNeal, Jr., President and Chief
Executive Officer, the Budd Co. (Aug. 19, 1982), reprinted in Subsidized Export Financing
Hearing, supra note 38, at 191 (emphasis in the original).
The Treasury Department reviewed the MTA's decision by discussing it with MTA offi-
cials and studying MTA documents. DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, supra note 96, at 8-9.
The Department also reviewed statements of parties to the dispute in hearings before the
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The timing of the Treasury Department's decision in the Budd
incident revealed another deficiency in section 1912: it imposed no
specific time limits on the Department's complex review procedure. 1 s
Secretary Regan's decision came almost sixty days after Budd
requested an investigation. By then, the MTA had already signed a
contract with Budd's foreign competition.' 19 The Budd Company was
thus forced to go to court in order to preserve its position while await-
ing the administrative decision.' 20
As a result of these deficiencies, section 1912 did not attain Con-
gress' goal of enhancing the United States' bargaining position in the
OECD Arrangement. Section 1912 provided a remedy for domestic
producers only when the noncompetitive financing was "a determining
factor" in a sale.' 2' This standard was difficult to satisfy, and it may
not have been a credible threat to foreign governments considering
subsidies for single-sale exports to the United States, because matching
financing often came too late to affect a completed single-sale
transaction.
IV
AMENDMENT: CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
THE BUDD DECISION
The decision to deny Budd matching financing prompted a flurry
of activity on Capitol Hill. Within two weeks, the Senate Finance
Committee held hearings to investigate the Treasury Department's
action. 22 Ultimately, congressional concern over the application of
section 1912 in the Budd case led to the introduction of legislation to
amend it.123 The 1983 amendment' 24 changed section 1912 in two
important respects: by imposing a sixty-day time limit for the initia-
tion and completion of Treasury Department investigations under sec-
tion 1912, and by requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize
matching financing if the availability of foreign financing is "likely to
Senate Finance Committee and in a public hearing conducted by the MTA. Subsidized
Export Financing Hearing, supra note 37, at 180 (U.S. Dep't of the Treas. Response for the
Record, Answer to Question Raised by Sen. Riegel).
118. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
119. The Decision of the Secretary is dated July 13, 1982. The Budd Company
requested Treasury Department investigation on May 18, 1982. Statement by Secretary of
the Treasury Donald T. Regan, at a Press Conference in Washington, D.C. on New York
Subway Cars (July 13, 1982), reprinted in DECISION OF THE SECRETARY, supra note 96,
120. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
122. See Subsidized Export Financing Hearing, supra note 37, at 1-3 (opening statement
of Sen. John Heinz).
123. H.R. 6760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
124. Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 631, 97 Stat.
1262 (1983) (to be codified as amendments to 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3).
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be one of the significant factors in the sale." 125  Congress rejected a
third proposal to remove wholly the discretion of the Treasury
Department and the Eximbank in determining whether to provide
matching funds.
A. SIXTY-DAY TIME LIMIT
Section 1912 is unique in United States trade law in that it pro-
vides a domestic producer the opportunity to compete on equal financ-
ing terms with foreign manufacturers who benefit from export credit
subsidization before the contract is awarded. If this remedy is to be
effective, the Treasury Department's decision whether to award
matching funds must be prompt.
Before the 1983 amendment, section 1912 contained no time lim-
its for the notifications and investigations to be conducted by the
Department. Section 1912 will now be of much greater value in
allowing an individual producer of "big ticket" capital items to com-
pete with subsidized foreign producers before the award of the sales
contract, because the amendment forces the Treasury Department to
render a prompt decision on matching financing.
The sixty-day time limit applies to all aspects of the decision to
authorize matching financing. In the Budd case, even if Treasury Sec-
retary Regan had authorized the Eximbank to award matching financ-
ing, an additional delay would have ensued before the Eximbank made
its financing decision. The 1983 amendment prevents further delay by
applying the time limits to the Eximbank's decision as well as to that
of the Treasury Department.
B. SIGNIFICANT FACTOR TEST
Dissatisfaction with the Treasury Department's interpretation of
what constitutes "a determining factor" in a sale prompted Congress
to alter the standard to "a significant factor." 126 The Treasury
Department's previous interpretation procedure was highly subjec-
tive.127 It asserted that financing was "a determining factor" only if
the contract would have been awarded to the United States bidder had
financing been equal. The Department's analysis was flawed; it
assumed that if financing terms were changed other features of a man-
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. See also Blanchard press release, supra note 84. In an earlier proposal Congress
used the words "relevant factor" instead of "significant" or "determining" factor. Con-
gress wisely chose the word "significant" over "relevant" because financing is likely to be a
"relevant factor" in all sales of capital goods. Section 1912 should prevent foreign competi-
tors from winning contracts over domestic producers only when subsidized financing plays
an important role in the sale.
127. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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ufacturer's offer would remain constant. 128 Had the Department and
the Eximbank awarded matching financing to Budd, the MTA might
have attempted to negotiate with Budd to change other aspects of the
offer that the MTA considered unsatisfactory. 129 The absence of
attractive financing may have destroyed the incentive to negotiate
regarding other unsatisfactory terms.
In applying section 1912 to the Budd case, the Department of the
Treasury effectively defined "a determining factor" to mean the deter-
mining factor. Under the Department's reading of the statute, match-
ing financing would be awarded only when the provision of matching
financing alone would cause a producer to award the contract to the
United States bidder. The Treasury Department should have recog-
nized that when matching financing is available, other features of an
offer may not remain constant. Section 1912 as amended eliminates
the possibility of such misinterpretation by adopting a more lenient
standard. Now, in order for discretionary matching financing to be
justified, foreign noncompetitive financing must only be a significant
factor.
C. TREASURY DEPARTMENT DISCRETION
The amended section 1912 not only adopts a more lenient and
understandable standard for Treasury Department determination, it
also reinstates the Department's discretion in awarding matching
financing. One proposed amendment to section 1912, which Congress
did not adopt in 1983, compelled the Treasury Department to author-
ize and the Eximbank to award matching funds whenever foreign
financing is a significant factor in the foreign subsidized sale.'30 Con-
gress wisely rejected this modification because it would have deprived
both the Eximbank and the Department of the discretion to determine
where to direct the limited Eximbank resources.' 3 '
128. See Transcript of Proceedings, In re Certain Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof
from Canada, Prelim. Investigation No. 701-TA-182 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n July 21,
1982) (statement of James H. Lundquist, Corporate Counsel, the Budd Co.).
129. In a hearing before the International Trade Commission during the preliminary
investigation into the Budd case, Steven Polan, Special Counsel to the MTA, stated:
Our intention was in the event that EX-IM had matched [sic] to bring in all three
bidders. . . . [t]hey would have all come in and they would have given their last
and best shot with respect to financing, with respect to car price, New York state
content, and every other factor that was of relevance to the MTA, and they could
have and we hoped that they would all modify their offers significantly in our
benefit.
Id at 184.
130. S. 869, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S3524 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1983).
131. The Reagan Administration opposed any amendment to section 1912 which would
remove the agencies' discretion to refuse matching financing. Subsidized Export Financing
Hearing, supra note 37, at 22 (statement of Marc E. Leland, Ass't Sec'y for Int'l Affairs,
Dep't of the Treas.).
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Large amounts of money are necessary to finance the sale of capi-
tal goods. In the Budd case, the Canadian export credit agency agreed
to finance approximately $560 million of the purchase price of the
Canadian subway cars. The Treasury Department estimated that the
Canadian Government subsidized $270 million of this figure. 132
Future sales could involve even greater subsidies. A large project that
is found to warrant matching financing would significantly tax the
Eximbank's resources. 133 The proposed modification of section 1912
would have stripped the Eximbank Board of its discretion to refuse
matching financing. Congress wisely retained the provisions of section
1912 that grant the Department of the Treasury and the Eximbank the
discretion to refuse matching financing. Without this refusal discre-
tion, United States export credit policy would be short-term and reac-
tive. Moreover, the United States' credibility in international forums,
where it has advocated curbs on export credit subsidies, would be min-
imized if U.S. law instituted a mandatory program of aggressive
export credit subsidies to aid U.S. manufacturers. Official support for
American producers is justifiable only if it benefits the U.S. economy
as a whole. The decision whether to match foreign subsidized financ-
ing should be a part of a long-term U.S. policy in the export credit
area, acknowledging the effect that financing may have on interna-
tional economies and relations.
CONCLUSION
The 1983 amendment to section 1912 will make the section an
important device in implementing U.S. international trade policy.
Section 1912 now enables the producers of major capital goods to pre-
vent the loss of a sales contract to foreign producers who benefit from
subsidized export financing. Before the 1983 amendment, section
1912 was poorly drafted. In the Budd incident, ambiguous language
in the statute prompted the Treasury Department to use an interpreta-
We do believe it essential to preserve latitude for judgment in the application of the
statute rather than making it an automatic process. . . . [t]o provide matching
financing in all cases where foreign "non-competitive" financing into the United
States exists, would establish an unacceptably expensive and unnecessary subsidy
entitlement program.
Eximbank Programs and Policies Hearings, supra note 60, at 200 (emphasis in the original)
(statement of Marc E. Leland).
132. Subsidized Export Financing Hearings, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Marc E.
Leland, Ass't Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treas.). "Credit of a similar size and
terms by Eximbank, based on its [then] current borrowing costs of about 13.6 percent
would involve a subsidy of probably about $220 million." Id.
133. See American and Foreign Practices in the Financing of Large Commercial Aircraft
Sales: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, 77
(1978) (statement of Gary C. Hufbauer, Dep. Ass't Sec'y of the Treas. for Int'l Trade and
Investment Pol'y).
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tion that avoided the purpose of section 1912. With the 1983 amend-
ment, Congress provided for the application of section 1912 in a
manner consistent with its original goal of providing an effective rem-
edy for domestic producers injured by subsidized export credits on for-
eign sales to U.S. markets. The Treasury Department and the
Eximbank must now decide within sixty days whether to award
matching financing to a domestic producer. This will help the domes-
tic producer to compete with the subsidized foreign producer.
The amended section 1912 will also strengthen the bargaining
position of the United States in international negotiations on export
credit subsidies. As interest rates have soared, the latitude for govern-
ment subsidization of noncompetitive export has increased. Foreign
export credit agencies may hesitate to subsidize exports to the United
States if there is a credible threat that the competitive advantage
gained by such subsidy will be negated by an Eximbank award of
matching financing to competing United States producers. If the ben-
efits of export credit subsidization can be nullified, foreign govern-
ments may come to share the United States' view that financing should
be a neutral element in international trade competition.134
Steven P. Buffone
134. The futility of export credit competition is already acknowledged in many ways by
the United States' competitors. Economic regulations of the European Economic Commu-
nity, for example, do not permit subsidized financing within the EEC. Trade Policy I Hear-
ings, supra note 4, at 300 (statement of Marc E. Leland).
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